Filed: Aug. 06, 1998
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED No. 97-8207 _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS D. C. Docket No.3:94-CV-51-GETELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/19/03 THOMAS K. KAHN GEORGIA MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., CLERK DESTINY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, versus SPALDING COUNTY, GEORGIA, MARTHA W. MCDANIEL, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. _ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (August 6
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED No. 97-8207 _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS D. C. Docket No.3:94-CV-51-GETELEVENTH CIRCUIT 2/19/03 THOMAS K. KAHN GEORGIA MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., CLERK DESTINY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, versus SPALDING COUNTY, GEORGIA, MARTHA W. MCDANIEL, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. _ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (August 6,..
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 97-8207
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
D. C. Docket No.3:94-CV-51-GETELEVENTH CIRCUIT
2/19/03
THOMAS K. KAHN
GEORGIA MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., CLERK
DESTINY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Cross-Appellants,
versus
SPALDING COUNTY, GEORGIA,
MARTHA W. MCDANIEL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
Cross-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 6, 1998)
Before BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
Spalding County, Georgia (County), amended its Zoning Ordinance to require
that manufactured homes be built with a 4:12 roof pitch to qualify for placement in
most residential districts. The district court struck down the 4:12 requirement, holding
that the 4:12 requirement violates equal protection, substantive due process, and the
dormant Commerce Clause and that the 4:12 requirement is preempted by federal law.
We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 4, 1994, Spalding County adopted the 4:12 requirement as part of
an amendment to its Zoning Ordinance. The amendment established three classes of
manufactured housing, two of which are relevant here. “Class A” manufactured
homes are homes1 that meet HUD standards for manufactured housing2 and satisfy
various additional criteria, including the following: the roof must have a pitch of at
least 4:12 (measured as the ratio of the roof’s rise to its horizontal run); the home must
have a width greater than 16 feet; the roof must be finished with shingles common to
residential construction; the exterior siding must be similar to common residential
construction; the area underneath the home must be enclosed by a masonry curtain
1
Manufactured homes are sometimes referred to as “mobile homes.”
2
Manufactured housing is regulated by the National Manufactured Housing Construction
and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426, pursuant to which the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) promulgated regulations related to construction and safety.
24 C.F.R. §§ 3280.1-3280.904.
2
wall; and the wheels and other transportation apparatus must be removed.3 “Class B”
manufactured homes are homes that meet HUD standards but do not satisfy the
additional criteria. The Zoning Ordinance permits placement of Class A homes in any
residential district as a matter of right; Class B homes are allowed in residential
districts only as exceptions. As a result of the Zoning Ordinance, most Class B homes
are placed in planned manufactured home communities.4
Appellees brought this action against the County to challenge the amended
Zoning Ordinance as it relates to manufactured housing. The district court struck
down the 4:12 roof-pitch requirement and held a bench trial to determine damages.5
The district court awarded $28,580 in damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
3
The Zoning Ordinance lists three additional requirements for Class A manufactured homes:
the homes must be installed in accordance with certain provisions of the Official Code of Georgia;
the landings must comply with the requirements regarding size and composition listed in Section
1113 of the Standard Building Code of the Southern Building Code Congress International; and the
homes must not be used as storage facilities.
4
Planned manufactured home communities are sometimes referred to as “mobile home
parks” or “trailer parks.”
5
Although Appellees challenged all provisions of the Zoning Ordinance relating to
manufactured housing, the district court specifically limited its order to the 4:12 requirement. After
declaring the 4:12 requirement unconstitutional, the district court entered a series of orders resolving
various procedural issues. On appeal, we address only the initial order striking down the 4:12
requirement.
3
awarded $236,715.60 in attorneys’ fees and $17,878.99 in expenses pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988. After the district court issued its order, the County filed this appeal.6
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s finding of fact for clear error; we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d
1369, 1373 (11th Cir. 1993).
A. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Appellees assert the 4:12 requirement violates their Fourteenth Amendment
rights to substantive due process and equal protection. Because the 4:12 requirement
does not target a protected class, the substantive due process and equal protection
claims both turn on the rational basis test; specifically, the 4:12 requirement must be
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of
Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1995).
The rational basis test consists of a two-prong inquiry:
6
Appellees filed a cross-appeal asserting, as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment
of the district court, that the 4:12 requirement violates the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 (FHA). Specifically, Appellees argue that the price increase resulting from the 4:12
requirement makes housing less affordable for two classes protected by the FHA: (1) families; and
(2) African Americans. The district court rejected this argument. The district court found that the
evidence presented by Appellees did not constitute a prima facie case of discrimination against
families. The district court also found that the overwhelming number of manufactured housing
residents in Spalding County are not African-American, demonstrating that the Zoning Ordinance
did not target this protected group. We agree with the district court and find no merit to the
arguments in Appellees’ cross-appeal.
4
The first step in determining whether legislation survives
rational-basis scrutiny is identifying a legitimate government purpose–a
goal–which the enacting government body could have been pursuing.
The actual motivations of the enacting governmental body are entirely
irrelevant. . . .
The second step of rational-basis scrutiny asks whether a rational
basis exists for the enacting governmental body to believe that the
legislation would further the hypothesized purpose. The proper inquiry
is concerned with the existence of a conceivably rational basis, not
whether that basis was actually considered by the legislative body. As
long as reasons for the legislative classification may have been
considered to be true, and the relationship between the classification and
the goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational, the legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny.
Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921-22 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also, TRM, Inc. v. United Sates,
52 F.3d 941, 945-46 (11th Cir.
1995). The first prong of this test is satisfied because the County could have been
pursuing the goal of “aesthetic compatibility,” seeking to reduce friction between the
appearance of site-built homes and manufactured homes by requiring manufactured
homes to conform with standard characteristics of site-built homes, such as roof pitch
and foundation. The goal of aesthetic compatibility is a legitimate government
purpose.
Haves, 52 F.3d at 923 (approving “aesthetic uniformity” as a legitimate
rationale to support municipal zoning decisions).
The second prong of the rational basis test is also satisfied. The County
rationally could have believed that the 4:12 requirement would advance the goal of
5
aesthetic compatibility among houses in residential districts by setting a minimum
roof pitch requirement for manufactured homes that conforms with the standard
characteristics of site-built homes. Although the demarcation of 4:12 as the threshold
of acceptability for the roof pitch of manufactured homes may seem no more
appropriate than 3:12 or 5:12, the County has the discretion to select a minimum ratio
to advance its goal of aesthetic compatibility. Reasonable minds may differ as to
where the line should be drawn or whether a line should be drawn at all, but the
discretion to resolve that disagreement lies with the County, not the courts.7 Haves,
52 F.3d at 923-24. Accordingly, the 4:12 requirement does not violate Appellees’
rights to substantive due process or equal protection.
B. Commerce Clause
The district court ruled that the 4:12 requirement violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, concluding that the resulting burden on commerce clearly
outweighs the putative benefit of aesthetic compatibility. In reaching this result, the
district court focused on the burden on commerce in general rather than examining the
specific burden on interstate commerce.
7
The district court based its conclusion in large part on evidence that the 4:12 requirement
does not actually advance the goal of aesthetic compatibility. That inquiry imposes an
inappropriately high level of scrutiny on the County’s decisions. Haves, 52 F.3d at 922-23.
6
The 4:12 requirement applies equally to in-state and out-of-state business
interests and its effects on interstate commerce are incidental. The 4:12 requirement
therefore will withstand scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause “unless the
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142,
90 S. Ct. 844,
847 (1970).
The district court made two findings regarding the burden on interstate
commerce: (1) the 4:12 requirement has caused significant problems for
manufacturers both within and outside of Georgia; and (2) the 4:12 requirement
increases costs for members of the industry and consumers of manufactured housing.
These findings alone do not demonstrate the kind of economic protectionism
forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. First, laws that impose the same burden
on in-state and out-of-state business interest usually do not violate the Commerce
Clause. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473,
101 S. Ct.
715, 728 (1981) (in holding that the burden posed on interstate commerce by a
Minnesota statute was not clearly excessive, the Court focused on the fact that both
in-state and out-of-state firms would be burdened equally: “there is no reason to
suspect that the gainers will be Minnesota firms, or the losers out-of-state firms.”).
As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely
7
affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.” Id. at 728 n.17.
Second, the resulting price increases of manufactured homes do not weigh heavily
against the 4:12 requirement because price increases generally do not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.,
437 U.S. 117, 127-
28,
98 S. Ct. 2207, 2215 (1978) (in upholding a Maryland statute prohibiting oil
refiners from operating retail gas stations, the Court stated: “It may be true that the
consuming public will be injured by the loss of the high-volume, low-priced stations
operated by the independent refiners, but again that argument relates to the wisdom
of the statute, not to its burden on commerce.”).
Appellees also assert that the 4:12 requirement discriminates against out-of-
state manufactured home producers because the entire manufactured housing market
(both in-state and out-of-state) will suffer at the expense of the site-built home market,
which, by its very nature, is local and therefore strictly in-state. The Fifth Circuit
rejected a similar argument in addressing a zoning ordinance that confined all
manufactured housing to planned manufactured home communities: “Plaintiffs have
not demonstrated that whatever mode of housing is built in lieu of HUD-code
manufactured homes, it will be provided by in-state suppliers.” Texas Manufactured
Housing Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1104 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __,
117 S. Ct. 2497 (1997). Similarly, Appellees have not proffered
8
evidence that the 4:12 requirement will significantly aid the local site-built market at
the expense of the manufactured housing market, and the district court did not make
any such finding of fact.
The relevant burden on interstate commerce is negligible and is not clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits of the 4:12 requirement.
Accordingly, the 4:12 requirement does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
C. Preemption
The district court ruled that the 4:12 requirement is preempted by the National
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5401-5426 (Act), because the 4:12 requirement “interferes with the Act’s
construction and safety requirements and cannot be enforced without impairing the
Federal government’s superintendence of the manufactured home industry.” Congress
defined the preemptive effect of the Act as follows:
Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and safety
standard established under this chapter is in effect, no State or political
subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any manufactured home covered, any
standard regarding construction or safety applicable to the same aspect
of performance of such manufactured home which is not identical to the
Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard.
42 U.S.C. § 5403(d). This Court has interpreted that subsection in the following
manner:
9
The language of the statute clearly precludes states and municipalities
from imposing construction and safety standards upon mobile homes
that differ in any respect from those developed by HUD. Thus, if the
Lynn Haven ordinance conditioned mobile home entry into or sale in the
town on compliance with the SSBC, thereby forcing manufacturers to
meet construction and safety requirements other than HUD standards in
order to do business in the City, the municipal act would be preempted.
Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) (footnote and
citation omitted). The district court appears to have relied in large part on the HUD
regulations that interpret the preemptive effect of the Act. The HUD regulations
provide:
No State or locality may establish or enforce any rule or regulation or
take any action that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. The test of
whether a State rule or action is valid or must give way is whether the
State rule can be enforced or the action taken without impairing the
Federal superintendence of the manufactured home industry as
established by the Act.
24 C.F.R. § 3282.11(d). In Scurlock, a panel of this Court cited § 3282.11(d) as the
overarching test for preemption. 858 F.2d at 1525.8
8
We are bound by Scurlock's approval of § 3282.11(d). See Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d
1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The law of the circuit is ‘emphatic’ that only the Supreme Court or
this court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior panel decision.”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
118 S. Ct. 1529 (1998). Nevertheless, we are not entirely convinced that the regulation is valid. The
HUD regulation seems to expand the scope of the unambiguous preemption provision enacted by
Congress. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d), with 24 C.F.R. § 3282.11(d); see also Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 517,
112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted.”).
10
Scurlock held that the Act preempted a local ordinance that forbade placement
of manufactured homes in residential districts unless the manufactured homes met
certain safety codes or had the seal of the Florida Department of Community Affairs.
Id. at 1522-23. Like the present case, manufactured homes could freely be placed in
planned manufactured home communities.
Id. at 1523. In considering the validity of
that ordinance, the Court explained that the City has broad discretion in enacting
zoning ordinances:
The law is well-settled that governmental bodies like Lynn Haven “have
the right to set minimum standards for housing in residentially-zoned
districts.” Grant v. County of Seminole, Fla., 817 F.2d 731, 736 (11th
Cir.1987). Municipalities may zone land to pursue any number of
legitimate objectives related to the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the community. See generally 1 R. Anderson, American Law
of Zoning 3d §§ 7.01- 7.03 (1986).
Id. at 1525. We concluded, however, that the City’s ordinance sought to control land
use through its safety code, and held that the ordinance was therefore preempted:
The City is attempting to exclude the Scurlock’s mobile home from its
R-AA section based solely on its safety code. The City building
inspector agreed that if the home met the Southern Building Code
requirement, a permit would be issued. Thus the City apparently wishes
to apply its safety code to enforce land use.
Id.
After Scurlock, we must decide whether the 4:12 requirement is a “construction
or safety standard” within the meaning of the Act, the enforcement of which would
11
impair the federal superintendence of the manufactured home industry. In defining
the preemptive scope of the Act, Scurlock detailed the Act's legislative history and the
HUD regulations as follows:
In considering the federal legislation and its impact upon the ordinance
enacted by Lynn Haven, we must turn to the legislative history and the
HUD regulations in order to resolve the federal preemption issue.
According to Congress, the purposes of the Act “are to reduce the
number of personal injuries and deaths and the amount of insurance costs
and property damage resulting from [mobile] home accidents and to
improve the quality and durability of [mobile] homes.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 5401. The Act undoubtedly represents consumer safety legislation.
See 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4279, 4340. Under its
provisions, manufacturers of mobile homes must notify purchasers about
any construction or safety defects and correct many at no charge to the
consumers. See id. § 5414(a), (g). If a manufacturer discovers a defect
before the mobile home is purchased by the consumer, it must
“immediately repurchase” the home from the dealer or provide for
repairs. Id. § 5412(a). Moreover, HUD is authorized to release to the
public information concerning construction and safety defects present in
particular homes, id. § 5413(c)(5), and manufacturers must provide
purchasers with manuals explaining the operation, maintenance, and
repair requirements of their mobile homes, id. § 5416. Finally, the Act
states that “[t]he rights afforded [mobile] home purchasers under this
chapter may not be waived, and any provision of a contract . . . to the
contrary shall be void.” Id. § 5421. However, while consumer
protection represents the primary goal of the legislation, complete safety
is not to be obtained at all expense: in promulgating regulations, HUD
must “consider the effect of [the standards] on the cost of [mobile]
home[s] to the public.” Id. § 5403(f)(4).
Pursuant to this congressional mandate HUD has developed
standards covering “all equipment and installations in the design,
construction, fire safety, plumbing, heat-producing and electrical systems
of [mobile] homes.” 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1(a). The HUD regulations seek
to establish performance requirements, see id. § 3280.1(b), in order to
12
protect the public against any unreasonable risk of death, injury, or the
occurrence of accidents due to the design or construction of mobile
homes, see id. § 3280.2(a)(18).
858 F.2d at 1524-25.
By defining the scope of the federal superintendence of the mobile home
industry, Scurlock established that the construction and safety standards preempted
by the Act are those standards that protect consumers from various potential hazards
associated with manufactured housing. In contrast, a zoning requirement related to
aesthetics is not be preempted because the goals and effects of such a standard have
nothing to do with consumer protection, but instead seek to control the aesthetic
quality of a municipality’s neighborhoods.
The 4:12 requirement is not preempted because it is not a construction or safety
standard within the meaning of the Act. Instead, the 4:12 requirement is an aesthetic
condition for placement of manufactured homes in residential districts. Unlike the
ordinance in Scurlock, the 4:12 requirement does not have any purported basis in
consumer protection, but is a straight-forward declaration that the County does not
want low-pitched roofs in its residential areas.9
9
This conclusion is supported by the district court’s quotation of the County’s
comprehensive land use plan adopted on April 4, 1994:
Unfortunately, uncontrolled development has led, in many instances, to incompatible
land uses being located next to each other. Several of these instances involve the
location of mobile homes in the County.
....
13
Furthermore, the 4:12 requirement does not impede the HUD standards because
it does not alter or excuse the requirements for HUD certification, but simply imposes
an aesthetic condition for placement of manufactured homes in certain localities
within the County.10 The preemptive scope of the Act is not so broad as to limit the
County’s authority to regulate aesthetics through its Zoning Ordinance. See
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485,
116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996) (in
performing preemption analysis, the Court explained that “we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). Accordingly, the 4:12 requirement is not
preempted by the Act.
In order to alleviate some of the friction caused by the development of mobile home
sites and subdivisions, the County is in the process of adopting a new Unified
Development Ordinance which will allow new mobile homes but requires that they
conform with standard stick built home characteristics such as roof pitches and
foundations.
10
The district court found that the 4:12 requirement forces builders to construct homes with
hinged roofs, i.e., roofs that are hinged to fold down during transportation. Pursuant to this method
of construction, ventilation and interior support mechanisms are not put in place until the home
arrives at its destination and the roof is straightened. Although HUD inspections normally occur at
the construction site, hinge-roofed homes receive HUD inspection and approval after arriving at
their destination through the issuance of an “alternate construction letter.” The 4:12 requirement
does not excuse compliance with the HUD standards. If it is impossible to satisfy both the HUD
standards and the County’s additional criteria, no manufactured homes will be designated Class A
and, therefore, all manufactured homes will be excluded from residential zones. Scurlock
recognized that such a result is permissible: “Undoubtedly [the City] could limit Zone R-AA to
conventionally-built residences and exclude mobile homes.” 858 F.2d at 1525.
14
III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in declaring the 4:12 requirement invalid. We reverse
the district court’s order, vacate the judgment, and remand for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED.
15
